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I. Introduction
FOR MANY CITIZENS, A ZONING DECISION is the most life-affecting gov-
ernment allocation of rights they will ever encounter.1 The planning
and zoning (P&Z) commission may recommend to the city council that
the land next door, currently a wheat field zoned agricultural, be rezoned
commercial for a new shopping mall, with the traffic routed right through
a previously quiet neighborhood. The board of zoning adjustment (BZA)
may give your neighbor a variance to allow a go-kart track in your
backyard. Your property value may be adversely affected—and along
with it, your life. Yet, despite the importance of these decisions, relatively
little has been done to ensure that the decision makers are impartial.
In an earlier article,2 researchers Jerry L. Anderson and Erin Sass
found that a vast majority of states impose no controls on the compo-
sition of zoning boards.3 A few have relatively minor occupational re-
strictions. For example, in Iowa a state statute requires that a majority
of each BZA must be comprised of people not “involved in the business
of purchasing and selling real estate.”4 This limitation provides little
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5. Anderson & Sass, supra note 2, at 460–68.
6. Anderson & Sass, supra note 2, at 449–50. This article found that, in cities with
populations over 25,000, approximately 75 percent of BZA members and 80 percent
of P&Z members were from professional, technical, or managerial occupations. Id. at
462–63. In addition, about half of the members of both boards had occupations that
would benefit directly or indirectly from additional development. Id. at 467. Some
individual boards were “packed” with pro-development interests. See Jim Pollock,
Drake Study Looks into Potential Bias on Zoning Boards, DES MOINES BUS. REC.,
Oct. 4, 2004, at 12 (6 of 7 West Des Moines zoning commission members had ties to
development activity).
7. Owens, supra note 1, at 309 (noting 72 percent of variances granted in North
Carolina survey); id. at 296–98 (describing other studies with similar results).
8. See, e.g., Edward J. Sullivan, Remarks to University of Oregon Symposium
Marking the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of S.B. 100, 77 OR. L. REV. 813, 840 (1998).
9. OR. REV. STAT. § 227.030(4).
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. IOWA CODE § 414.8 (2003).
protection against bias, however, because others involved in the devel-
opment process, including contractors, lenders, and architects, are not
covered by this limitation. The empirical data from Iowa confirmed
that, without meaningful restrictions on board appointments, the oc-
cupational distribution of board members is skewed.5 Especially in
larger cities, blue-collar citizens—and presumably their concerns—
were significantly underrepresented. Moreover, the study found that
occupations tied to development—such as contractors, real estate agents,
and lenders—made up a large percentage of these zoning boards, po-
tentially resulting in a systemic bias in favor of development.6 The
composition of the boards may partially explain why surveys have con-
sistently found that about three-quarters of variance requests are granted.7
Oregon has one of the nation’s most comprehensive land use man-
agement programs, shifting more control to the state level.8 Moreover,
Oregon is one of the few states to have imposed greater controls on the
composition of zoning boards. First, Oregon law attempts to achieve
broader occupational distribution by prohibiting the selection of more
than two P&Z commission members from the same occupational cate-
gory.9 Second, Oregon’s land-use statute allows “no more than two
members of the commission [to be drawn from those] engage[d] prin-
cipally in the buying, selling or developing of real estate.”10 Iowa’s
limitation on real estate interests applies only to those engaged in “pur-
chasing and selling” property and requires only that a “majority” of the
board members be drawn from other occupations.11 Thus, at least on
the surface, Oregon’s law should result in less occupational bias on
P&Z commissions.
We decided to survey Oregon commissions to determine whether the
occupational restrictions result in improved board composition. The
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12. The complete survey can be accessed at http://facstaff.law.drake.edu/jerry.
anderson/Oregonresearch.html [hereinafter Oregon Survey].
13. Anderson & Sass, supra note 2.
14. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (1926),
available at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct1926.pdf (last
visited Dec. 3, 2005).
15. See Anderson & Sass, supra note 2, at 450. This article and the Iowa article
focus solely on city, rather than county, zoning boards.
16. 1973 Or. Laws ch. 80 (codified as amended at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 197.005–
197.860).
17. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.175(2)(a).
results indicate that Oregon’s law restricting commission membership
represents some progress in reducing the potential for bias. The law
does result in lower percentages of commission members whose oc-
cupations are tied either directly or indirectly to development interests.
Nonetheless, the survey identified loopholes in the law that still allow
for potentially biased boards in some municipalities. Moreover, the law
does not cure the overrepresentation of white-collar occupations on
zoning commissions. This article recommends that states adopt a mod-
ified version of the Oregon statute to achieve better representational
results.
After describing Oregon’s unique land use control system, this article
will detail the results of our survey of Oregon municipalities.12 We will
compare the results to the similar Iowa survey, published in 2004,13 to
determine whether Oregon’s more stringent law is achieving better rep-
resentation. Finally, we will suggest improvements to the law we think
may result in zoning boards with even less potential for bias.
II. Oregon’s Land Use System
The Iowa survey focused on the composition of the state’s P&Z com-
missions and the BZA, which are typical bodies with zoning authority
in states whose systems are based on the Standard State Zoning En-
abling Act (SSZEA).14 The BZA typically rules on variances and special
exemptions, while the P&Z commission recommends zoning amend-
ments to the city council or county board of supervisors and has au-
thority to approve plats for development.15 Oregon, however, created a
unique land use control system, which features greater control and co-
ordination at the state level. The local zoning bodies also differ, in terms
of their powers and responsibilities, from the commissions and boards
found in SSZEA states. Therefore, a brief explanation of Oregon’s sys-
tem is required.
In 1973, Oregon enacted a statewide comprehensive land use man-
agement scheme, the Oregon Planning Act (the “Act”).16 The Act re-
quires each city and county to adopt a comprehensive plan.17 Each local
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18. Id. §§ 197.175(2)(a), 197.040(2).
19. Land Conversion and Dev. Comm’n of Or., A Summary of Oregon’s Statewide
Planning Goals, www.lcd.state.or.us/LCD/docs/goals/goalssummary.pdf. (last visited
Dec. 2, 2005).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.175(2)(d).
24. Id. § 197.175(2)(c). A plan may be acknowledged as meeting some goals but
not others, meaning that the applicable law will consist of a mixture of the local plan
and state goals.
25. Id. § 197.629.
26. Sara C. Galvan, Gone Too Far: Oregon’s Measure 37 and the Perils of Over-
Regulating Land Use, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y R. 587, 589 n.10 (2005) (citing Edward J.
Sullivan, Comprehensive Planning, 36 URB. LAW. 541 (2004) (only a handful of states
elevate comprehensive plan to status of law)).
27. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.830.
28. Id. § 197.015 (10).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 197.015(12).
plan and its implementing regulations must comply with a set of state-
wide goals adopted by a state agency, the Land Conservation and De-
velopment Commission (LCDC).18 There are currently nineteen state
goals, covering everything from the conservation of agricultural land
and beaches, to addressing energy and transportation needs.19 For ex-
ample, Goal 14 addresses urbanization and “requires cities to estimate
future growth and needs for land and then plan and zone enough land
to meet those needs.”20 The urbanization goal requires establishment of
an “urban growth boundary” to “identify and separate urbanizable land
from rural land.”21 Goal 10 requires planning and accommodation for
needed housing types.22
The LCDC reviews each local plan for consistency with the state
goals. If the plan and its implementing regulations meet a state goal,
the LCDC “acknowledges” them and the local government may use
them to make land use decisions.23 Until acknowledgement, however,
the state’s goals are directly applicable to local land use decisions.24
After being “acknowledged,” local land use plans and regulations must
be reviewed periodically to ensure that they remain in compliance with
the goals, or any new or amended criteria.25 This review process takes
on crucial significance, because Oregon is one of only a few states to
give the comprehensive plan the force of law.26
In order to provide for more efficient and uniform review of land-
use decisions, the Oregon legislature created a state board, the Land
Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), to hear appeals in land use cases.27 Its
jurisdiction encompasses both “land use decision[s],”28 which includes
the “adoption, amendment or application”29 of comprehensive plans
and land-use regulations, and “limited land use decision[s],”30 which
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31. Id. § 197.825.
32. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.835(5).
33. Id. § 197.835(6).
34. Id. § 197.850(7)(a).
35. Anderson & Sass, supra note 2, at 450.
36. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 14, at § 7.
37. Id. at § 6; ANDERSON’S AM. LAW OF ZONING § 21:16 (West 2005), available
at Westlaw as AMLZONING § 21:16 (last updated Nov. 2005).
38. ANDERSON’S AM. LAW OF ZONING § 25:10 (West 2005), available at Westlaw
as AMLZONING § 21:10 (last updated Nov. 2005).
39. OR. REV. STAT. § 227.020.
40. Id. § 227.090.
41. Id. § 227.100.
42. Id. § 227.173; see, e.g., Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. City of W. Linn, 86 P.3d
1140 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
43. OR. REV. STAT. § 227.175.
44. Id. § 227.180; see id. § 227.165 (hearing officer duties); see also Dep’t of
Transp. v. City of Mosier, 984 P.2d 351 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (city may also use hearing
officer for other categories of zoning matters).
includes subdivision approvals or denials and the application of discre-
tionary standards.31 LUBA will reverse a land use decision that is not
consistent with an acknowledged comprehensive plan or, if the plan is
not acknowledged, with the statewide goals.32 It will also reverse an
amendment to a comprehensive plan that it determines is not consistent
with the state’s goals.33 Appeals from LUBA decisions are filed directly
with the Oregon Court of Appeals.34
In most states, which use the SSZEA as the basis of land use control,
primary zoning authority rests with two separate bodies: the BZA and
the P&Z commission.35 Although generalizations cannot capture the
variety of zoning structures in use, typically the BZA has the authority
to grant variances and special exceptions from zoning regulations.36 The
P&Z commission makes recommendations to the city council regarding
zoning amendments, and may have the power to grant or at least make
recommendations regarding special permits.37 The P&Z commission
also typically is the body that reviews and approves subdivision plats.38
Oregon law authorizes only one local zoning body: the planning
commission.39 The commission makes preliminary recommendations
to the city council regarding zoning districts and the comprehensive
plan.40 The commission also approves development plats,41 discretion-
ary permits,42 and zoning changes.43 If a hearing officer makes the initial
decision regarding discretionary permits or zoning amendments, the
planning commission may hear appeals from those decisions.44 Thus,
the planning commission in Oregon seems to have even more authority
over development activity than the typical P&Z commission in SSZEA
jurisdictions.
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45. See, e.g., Kelley v. Clackamas County, 973 P.2d 916 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
46. OR. REV. STAT. § 227.030(1).
47. Id. § 227.030(4).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 244.135.
50. Anderson & Sass, supra note 2, at 451.
51. OR. REV. STAT. § 244.135(1).
52. Id. § 244.135(1)(a).
53. Id. § 244.135(1)(b).
54. Id. § 244.135(1)(c).
The commission does not issue variances, however. Hardship-based
variances, the primary purview of the BZA in SSZEA states, do not go
through citizen board review at all in Oregon. Instead, the variance
application is dealt with by city staff, with a possible appeal to a hearing
officer and then to the city council. The grant or denial of a variance
may then be appealed to the LUBA.45
Oregon state law places several limitations on the appointment of
planning commission board members. First, the law specifies that no
more than two members of the city planning commission may be city
officers, and even those members may serve only in an ex officio non-
voting capacity.46 Second, to prevent one particular profession from
dominating a commission, the law prohibits more than two voting
members who are “engaged in the same kind of occupation, business,
trade, or profession.”47 Finally, the statute deals directly with devel-
opment interests, prohibiting more than two members who “engage
principally in the buying, selling, or developing of real estate for profit”
either as individuals or as employees or officers of a business in that
line.48
Oregon law specifically addresses conflicts of interest of planning
commission members.49 This type of specific conflict of interest law at
the state level, especially one directed specifically at a planning com-
mission, is rare and reflects the legislature’s recognition of the power
these bodies have.50 The conflicts law prohibits a planning commission
member from participating in any commission proceeding or action in
which he or she has a “direct or substantial financial interest.”51 The
statute further prohibits participation if the member’s spouse, sibling,
child, parent, father-in-law or mother-in-law has a financial interest.52
Finally, the statute prohibits participation if a business in which the
member has served within the previous two years has a direct interest.53
This limitation also extends to any business with which the member is
negotiating for or has an arrangement or understanding concerning pro-
spective partnership or employment.54 While this statute would seem
to prevent the most blatant forms of self-dealing, the term “direct or
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55. Id. § 244.135(1).
56. Anderson & Sass, supra note 2, at 453–54 (only Michigan and Minnesota have
any kind of occupational restriction on zoning board membership; Tennessee has a
gender and racial diversity requirement for some cities).
57. We used population data from the 2000 census for selecting these municipalities
and analyzing the data. Census data is generally available on the internet at www.
census.gov.
substantial financial interest” is not defined, which may allow it to be
interpreted narrowly.55 As of the writing of this article, there are no
reported cases construing the statute.
Oregon has made one of the few attempts to achieve a better com-
position of zoning board members, and its law is certainly the most far-
reaching.56 The question is whether it has had any real effect on achiev-
ing its purpose. By comparing the composition of Oregon zoning
boards with those in Iowa, which has minimal restrictions on board
membership, we hoped to determine whether the law is working or
whether further restrictions would be desirable.
III. The Oregon Planning Commission Survey
In the fall of 2004, we sent a survey to every Oregon municipality with
a population greater than 1,000 people.57 The survey questionnaire
asked the municipality to list the occupation and employer of each
member of its planning commission. The questionnaire also asked the
city to detail any restrictions that city ordinances imposed on the com-
position of the commission, and any city policy regarding conflicts of
interest. We also asked the participants to identify whether any of the
commissioners’ family members were engaged in occupations con-
nected with development.
We received a good response from the Oregon municipalities. Out
of the 150 municipalities surveyed, seventy-one responded, resulting
in a 47 percent response rate. As Table 1 on page 70 shows, all sixteen
of the larger cities responded; the level of response was relatively con-
sistent among all other population size categories.
The responses we received indicated that Oregon’s law has not re-
duced the general overrepresentation of white-collar occupations on
zoning commissions. The occupational restrictions, however, have ap-
parently reduced the percentage of commission members who have a
direct pro-development interest. Nevertheless, the results indicate that
the law does not go far enough to eliminate the potential for commis-
sions to be populated largely by those with some development interest.
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Table 1—Response Rates of Municipalities Surveyed
Population Cities Surveyed Responses Response Rate
1,000 to 2,499 56 23 41%
2,500 to 4,999 27 10 37%
5,000 to 9,999 25 10 40%
10,000 to 24,999 26 12 46%
Over 25,000 16 16 100%
Total 150 71 47%
58. Anderson & Sass, supra note 2, at 458–65.
59. Id. at 459 (citing ROBERT A. WALKER, THE PLANNING FUNCTION IN URBAN
GOVERNMENT 150 (2d ed. 1950)).
60. ROBERT A. WALKER, THE PLANNING FUNCTION IN URBAN GOVERNMENT 150
(2d ed. 1950).
61. Id. at 152–53.
62. Anderson & Sass, supra note 2, at 464.
63. Id. at 463–64.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. OR. REV. STAT. § 227.030(4).
A. Occupational Distribution
The Iowa survey article explained the importance of appointing a rep-
resentative cross-section of the community to zoning boards.58 An early
survey, conducted by Robert Walker in 1937, found that planning com-
missions in large cities were composed mainly of businessmen, realtors,
lawyers, architects, and engineers.59 These occupations accounted for
about 80 percent of all commission members.60 Walker worried that the
tilt toward white-collar occupations resulted in commissions that would
be more sympathetic to development interests than to the interests of
the common citizen.61
The Iowa survey found that, almost seventy years later, this skew
toward white-collar occupations remains, especially in larger cities.62
The Iowa results indicate that, overall, about 60 percent of the occu-
pations represented on the state’s P&Z commissions fell into the pro-
fessional/technical/managerial category—almost double the percentage
of those occupations in the public at large.63 This overrepresentation
increased along with city size; in cities over 25,000, the percentage of
“white-collar” commission members rose to about 80 percent.64 We con-
cluded that appointing a more representative cross-section of the com-
munity would probably better reflect the values of the entire population.65
Oregon law prohibits more than two persons from any one occupa-
tional type on a zoning board.66 We wanted to determine whether this
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Table 2—Occupational Demographics of Overall Population
Occupational group Iowa Oregon
Professional, Technical, Managerial 31.3% 33.1%
Clerical/Sales 25.9 26.1
Service 14.8 15.3
Agricultural 1.1 1.7
Processing, Trades, Labor 27.0 23.8
67. Peter Fronczek & Patricia Johnson, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Occupations 2000,
at 1–2, 8 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-25.pdf.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Oregon Survey, supra note 12.
restriction results in a better cross-section of occupational categories.
In terms of their populations’ occupational distribution, the demograph-
ics of the two states are almost identical. Table 2 shows the percentages
of the overall Iowa and Oregon workforce in various occupational cate-
gories, drawn from the 2000 census.67 In both states, only about a third
of the workforce falls into the “professional, technical, and managerial”
class.68
The demographic data in Table 2 are drawn from the 2000 census.69
However, in order to match these categories with those in our survey
data, we have collapsed the census categories of “construction, extrac-
tion, and maintenance” and “production, transportation, and material
moving” into one category, called “processing, trades, and labor” which
corresponds with the Department of Labor classifications we used.
Moreover, the census category “agricultural” does not include farmers
who own their land.70 They are instead classified in the managerial
group.71 Our data below, however, categorize farmers as “agricultural.”
In addition, our survey data included “housespouse” and unemployed
persons, while the census categories do not.72 As a result of these dif-
ferences, “white-collar” workers represent an even smaller percentage
of available commission appointees than these statistics show.
The Oregon survey indicates that the state’s zoning board restriction
has not been effective in achieving a better cross-section of occupa-
tional groups.73 In fact, the Oregon results are strikingly similar to
Iowa’s. Table 3 on page 72 shows the distribution of occupations on
P&Z commissions in Oregon including retired members (categorized
by their last occupations). Table 4 on page 73 gives the same infor-
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Table 3—Occupations of Oregon Zoning Board Members
(including retired members by last occupations)
Occupations Total
1,000–
2,499
2,500–
4,999
5,000–
9,999
10,000–
24,999 25,000
Prof./Tech./Managerial 306
74.6%
85
68%
50
83.3%
39
65%
63
77.8%
69
90.8%
Clerical/Sales 26
6.3
8
6.4
3
5.0
5
8.3
8
9.9
2
2.6
Service 32
7.8
9
7.2
6
10.0
8
13.3
6
7.4
3
3.9
Agricultural 3
.7
2
1.6
0
0.0
1
1.7
0
0.0
0
0.0
Labor/Proc./Trades 30
7.3
12
9.6
7
11.7
5
8.3
4
4.9
2
2.6
Unemployed/Housespouse 13
3.2
9
7.2
2
3.3
2
3.3
0
0.0
0
0.0
Total 410 125 60 60 81 76
74. It could be argued that retired individuals do not have the same occupational
biases as those currently employed. Conversely, one could argue that a worker will
retain at least some of the bias inherent in whatever occupational class they devoted
their working life to.
75. Oregon Survey, supra note 12.
76. Anderson & Sass, supra note 2, at 464.
77. As in the Iowa survey, these numbers exclude responses indicating that the
occupation of a board member was “unknown.” This response was made for a total of
fifty-one board members, or 11 percent, again very similar to the Iowa survey results.
Anderson & Sass, supra note 2, at 462. Thus, the tables more properly could be said
to summarize the percentages of known occupations of zoning board members.
mation with retired respondents excluded.74 Again, while only a third
of Oregon’s workforce can be classified as professional, technical, or
managerial, about 75 percent of the state’s P&Z board members come
from that occupational category.75 Thus, white-collar occupations con-
tinue to be significantly overrepresented, having approximately twice
their respective percentage of the population. As in Iowa, the distri-
butional skew is worse in larger cities.76 In municipalities over 25,000,
the percentage of white-collar zoning board members rises to almost
90 percent, with or without retired workers.77
Some of the overrepresentation of the white-collar occupations may
be understandable. A significant percentage of the population listed
under “service” occupations, for example, may be students or younger
people working in restaurants or other service occupations as they go
through school. Indeed, labor statistics indicate that the median age of
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Table 4—Occupations of Oregon Zoning Board Members
(excluding retired members)
Occupations Total
1,000–
2,499
2,500–
4,999
5,000–
9,999
10,000–
24,999 25,000
Prof./Tech./Managerial 268
74.7%
68
68%
44
74.6%
36
65.5%
55
75.3%
65
90.3%
Clerical/Sales 24
6.7
6
6.0
3
5.1
5
9.1
8
11.0
2
2.8
Service 25
7.0
5
5.0
4
6.8
7
12.7
6
8.2
3
4.2
Agricultural 3
.8
2
2.0
0
0.0
1
1.8
0
0.0
0
0.0
Labor/Proc./Trades 26
7.2
10
10.0
6
10.2
4
7.3
4
5.5
2
2.8
Unemployed/Housespouse 13
3.6
9
9.0
2
3.4
2
3.6
0
0.0
0
0.0
Total 359 100 59 55 73 72
78. Labor statistics indicate that the mean age of the workforce is 40.5 years, while
the average for service workers is 36.5 and sales is 38.7 years. Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics, Employment and Earnings, Annual Average Data, T.15 at 1, 5, 7 (Jan. 2005).
79. Id. at 1.
80. Id. at 11.
81. OR. REV. STAT. § 227.030(4).
service employees is a full four years younger than the median age of
the workforce as a whole, while the median sales employee is two years
younger.78 The median age of the managerial/professional occupation,
conversely, is forty-three; six years older than the median service
worker.79 Thus, if we assume that most people appointed to city posts
are middle-aged or older, it may be that part of the skew is due to the
relative maturity of the white-collar group. It does not help explain the
under-representation of the labor group, however, as the median age of
that group is about the same as the national median.80 As we discussed
in the Iowa article, the white-collar group may simply be more involved
in local politics and more comfortable with public roles. They may also
have more time flexibility and therefore be more willing to serve.
Regardless of the reasons, Oregon’s law limiting these commissions
to no more than two individuals per “kind of occupation” has not had
an appreciable effect on the overall occupational distribution.81 The
failure of the statute to achieve much diversity may be traced to the
ambiguity of the restriction. If the term “kind of occupation” is con-
strued narrowly to mean the specific job rather than the job category,
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82. Oregon Survey, supra note 12.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Anderson & Sass, supra note 2, at 459–60 (citing WALKER, supra note 60, at
150–55).
the limitation would not constrain many appointments. Thus, having
two lawyers and two accountants and two architects would not violate
the law, even though the board would end up with six “professionals.”
Some specific examples from the survey illustrate how difficult it is
to interpret and apply the occupational restriction. The survey turned up
one seemingly clear violation of the law: one city near Oregon’s high-
tech Sunset Corridor listed three “software engineers” on its board.82
Regardless of whether “type of occupation” is construed broadly (i.e.,
engineers, or even more broadly, professionals) or narrowly (software
engineers), this would violate the limit of two members per type of
occupation. Another city listed four “small business owners.”83 If the
term is construed broadly, these four are involved in the same “type of
occupation.” Yet the differing nature of their businesses would seem to
avoid the harm at which the law was aimed. If their occupations are
defined more narrowly, such as “floral shop owner” and “hardware store
owner,” for example, the statute’s restriction is easily avoided. Another
city listed three persons in “sales,” which is one “kind of occupation,”
but again, the differing types of products they sell could distinguish
them.84 On the other hand, City #93 listed two “general contractors”
and one “home builder,” which could easily be deemed one category
(i.e., building industry) and could be more of a concern.85
The term “type of occupation” should be interpreted and applied
according to the legislative intent, of course. Presumably, the law at-
tempts to achieve occupational diversity. The legislative goal may have
been to prevent one occupational viewpoint from dominating any par-
ticular board and thereby biasing decisions in its favor. If that is the
goal, it may not matter if there are three software engineers, or three
salespeople, or three business owners on a commission, unless they
represent a coherent development bias. As long as they are objective,
fair arbiters, the commission will presumably function well.
On the other hand, the legislature may have had a broader goal in
mandating occupational diversity. The law may, in fact, originate in the
concern voiced by Robert Walker that drawing too much from one
occupational group will not reflect the values and interests of society
as a whole.86 If that is the goal, however, the restriction should be
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87. Id. at 465–68.
88. Id. at 465.
89. Id. at 467.
90. These numbers included retired persons in their last known occupation and ex-
cluded members whose occupations were “unknown.” Excluding retired persons, about
48 percent of P&Z members had unbiased occupations. Id.
construed broadly and four small business owners, regardless of the
differences in what they sell, would violate the restriction. Replacing a
doctor with a lawyer or an accountant may not make much difference
in terms of diversity of viewpoints. Construing the term “type of oc-
cupation” broadly would serve its purpose better, it seems.
Amending the law to better achieve the goal of occupational diversity
may be difficult. It would be possible to define the term “type of oc-
cupation” in terms of the broad census or labor department categories.
Moreover, just as some types of boards require a balance of Democrats
and Republicans, or require an equal number of men or women, the
law could mandate diversity by requiring the appointment of at least
one member of each occupational group. However, attempting to fix a
quota for labor, service, and professional commission members may
unduly hamper the appointment process and, especially for smaller cit-
ies, pose problems in trying to find qualified, interested participants.
For this type of thankless and often time-consuming service, appointing
those who are enthusiastic about serving may be the most important
criterion.
B. Occupational Bias
The Iowa survey attempted to identify certain occupations that would
have a generalized, inherent bias in favor of development.87 Some oc-
cupations were identified as having a “direct” connection or benefit
from increased development, such as real estate agents, contractors,
appraisers, and lenders.88 Other occupations could be said to “indi-
rectly” benefit from increased development, including owners of floor-
ing or hardware stores, or even the owner of a local motel. Occupations
with no development bias include teachers, postal workers, government
workers, and computer programmers. Undoubtedly, the classification
is subjective, but we believe that most people would disagree with these
classifications only at the margins. The idea that architects or landsca-
pers would, in general, favor increased development seems to be a safe
assumption.
The Iowa survey found that about 30 percent of P&Z commission
members had occupations associated with direct bias, while another 20
percent had indirect bias positions.89 About half of the commission
members had “unbiased” occupations.90 BZA members had similar bias
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numbers.91 While Iowa’s attempt to limit the number of board members
directly interested in real estate development represented at least some
progress in selecting balanced boards, it apparently had not achieved
its goal.
Because Oregon has enacted the strictest law concerning zoning
commission bias in the country, we wanted to see whether it had made
a difference in these numbers. In addition to the occupational restric-
tions discussed above, Oregon law prohibits the appointment of more
than two commission members who are engaged in buying, selling, or
developing real estate.92
Our survey reveals that the law seems to have reduced the percentage
of members with pro-development bias, but only by a modest amount.
The numbers may be affected somewhat by the large number of survey
responses in which members were identified as retired, with their pre-
vious employment listed as “unknown” (9 percent of total). Because
they are retired, it may be legitimate to include them in the “no bias”
category, based on the likelihood that they do not stand to gain from
development, regardless of their previous careers. On the other hand,
one could also exclude them on the ground that their previous occu-
pation could be relevant to a determination of bias. In the end, we listed
the results both ways. The Iowa survey excluded anyone whose occu-
pation was listed as “unknown,” including retired persons.93 While
Iowa has a slightly higher percentage of persons older than sixty-five
(14.9 percent versus 12.8 percent for Oregon),94 the Oregon survey
included several towns with a high percentage of retirees, in which all
or most of the board members were listed as “retired.”95
As Table 5 illustrates, the Oregon numbers represent only a slight
improvement from the Iowa board composition. Roughly one-fourth of
board members have a direct stake in development projects, while an-
other 17 percent to 19 percent could be said to be indirectly biased.
Overall, about 60 percent of the state’s board members have no occu-
pational pro-development bias. In contrast, Iowa’s P&Z commissions
had only 50 percent unbiased occupations. While the improvement over
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Table 5—Potential Pro-Development Bias on
Oregon P&Z Commissions96
Type of Interest
Including
Ret./Unk.
Excluding
Ret./Unk.
Iowa
P & Z
Iowa
BZA
Direct 24% 26% 30% 30%
Indirect 17 19 20 16
No Bias 59 55 50 54
96. Oregon Survey, supra note 12.
97. Id.
98. Id.
Iowa is slight, at least a clear majority of board members in Oregon
have no occupational bias.
For many, these bias figures may raise little concern. After all, as we
pointed out in the previous article, those with development experience
bring valuable expertise to these issues and, of course, their interest in
the proceedings may make them conscientious and active members.
Moreover, the pro-development view should be represented on the
board just as much as any other interest. While the improvement over
Iowa is slight, at least a clear majority of board members in Oregon
have no discernable occupational basis.
Nevertheless, the survey also uncovered individual cases of boards
dominated by development interests. The best illustration of the Oregon
law’s failure to eliminate occupational bias might be City #139.97 The
city’s zoning commission is composed of a real estate agent, a planner
(engineering firm), a landscape architect, an appraiser, an architect (re-
tired), a motel manager, and a small business owner.
Every single member of this board has at least an indirect occupa-
tional bias in favor of development. The first four members listed are
directly involved in development activity and would have a direct oc-
cupational bias.98 Preservation of open space, for example, would not
provide additional business for the landscape architect, the appraiser,
the engineer, or the real estate agent. The architect, who would other-
wise be in the direct bias category, is retired, but may retain connections
to and be influenced by his or her previous occupation. Finally, both
the motel manager and the small business owner would likely favor
growth, which would provide them additional customers. Moreover,
every single commission member is drawn from the professional, man-
agerial, and technical class. If this were an economic development com-
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mittee or a chamber of commerce, this occupational composition would
be desirable; but for a body that is supposed to be ruling neutrally on
zoning changes and special permit requests, a more balanced occupa-
tional mix would be preferable.
Nevertheless, City #139 is not in violation of Oregon’s composition
restrictions, which illustrates that the restrictions do not go far enough
to solve the problem.99 The law states that the commission is limited
to two members engaged in buying, selling, or developing real estate.100
This may apply only to the real estate agent in our example. A broad
reading of the term “developing” real estate would also encompass the
landscaper, perhaps. However, it does not clearly apply to an appraiser
or a planner or even an architect. Nor does the prohibition on more
than two members from the same “type of occupation” apply either,
unless the term is construed broadly to mean “something to do with
property development.” Thus, the law does not prevent the domination
of individual commissions by development interests.
As in the occupational diversity category, the problem may lie in
how the term “developing” real estate is construed. In order to fulfill
the legislature’s presumed intention to reduce direct occupational bias,
we believe the term should be interpreted broadly to encompass any
occupation that directly assists or is involved in the land development
process. The legislature should amend the restriction to make this def-
inition clear.
Arguably, the bias of Oregon commissions is less important than in
SSZEA states because of the prominence of statewide development
goals that are, at least in theory, strictly adhered to in comprehensive
plans. Moreover, the availability of LUBA review may ameliorate the
bias problem. This article does not discuss whether the reality of
Oregon’s statewide system matches the theory. Nevertheless, it is safe
to assume that local commissions still retain significant discretion in
this process and that their decisions are given deference in any review.
IV. Conclusion
Oregon’s land use law represents a good first step toward achieving
better zoning board composition. By limiting members tied to real es-
tate interests, the law has resulted in fewer boards dominated by those
who stand to gain from development activity. Nevertheless, the law
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cannot be deemed a complete success. It has not made any impact on
the distributional skew in favor of white-collar occupations. The fear
remains that, without better representation of labor and service occu-
pations, boards may tend to give less credence or value to blue-collar
concerns and more value to development that favors business interests.
Second, the occupational limitations have reduced, but have not
eliminated, pro-development bias. The law does not control occupa-
tions that are closely tied to development, such as architects or land-
scapers. It also fails to deal with persons who are retired from devel-
opment positions but who may still have strong ties to those interests.
As a result, there remain instances of boards almost totally dominated
by pro-development interests.
We therefore recommend that zoning composition laws follow the
Oregon model, but with a few alterations to improve distributional rep-
resentation. The limit of two members engaged in buying, selling, or
developing real estate should be expanded to include anyone who con-
tracts directly with real estate developers (e.g., architects, appraisers,
contractors, and landscapers). Moreover, the law should clearly specify
that the limitation include those who actively engaged in those occu-
pations within the last five years.
Addressing the white-collar bias is more difficult. The Oregon law
restricting more than two members of a “type of occupation” could be
amended to define occupational categories broadly, in accordance with
Labor or Census Department classifications.101 Alternatively, the law
could simply mandate that a board achieve “a broad cross-section of
occupations,” but such a restriction would be vague and presumably
unenforceable.
A first step toward solving the board diversity problem is to raise
awareness among those with appointment authority and encourage
them to seek to achieve a broader mix of individuals. Because these
positions often entail time-consuming and thankless work, it may be
difficult to attract volunteers outside of those with some direct or in-
direct development interest. Therefore, constant awareness of the ten-
dency to select pro-development members can help guard against it.
Perhaps cities could explore offering remuneration for board service in
order to attract those who otherwise would have no interest in such an
appointment. It may be that turning over some decisions to professional
staff members who are supposedly neutral, as Oregon has done with
certain categories of zoning decisions, may be an answer.
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Whatever approach is taken, the surveys show that the representa-
tional skew is not limited to one state. The decisions made by these
boards are important enough to merit action and further study to ensure
a balanced playing field for all interests in this process.
